What Happens When Attacking Gets Cheaper Than Patching


AI is making cyberattacks cheaper. It may also be making our response to them more dangerous.

Picture an attacker who can generate and test 100,000 attacks for what used to cost 100. Most of them fail. But that doesn’t matter. He just throws those away and keeps the few that work.

Now picture the bank on the other side. It can’t push 100,000 changes into production and hope the failures are harmless. Every change has to be checked against dependencies, data integrity, uptime and customer impact.

That gap is what worries the crap out of me about AI and cybersecurity. Attackers get cheap iterations. Defenders don’t.

The economics are changing

Sophisticated cyberattacks used to require scarce expertise. Finding vulnerabilities, developing exploits and getting around defenses took time and skill. AI is lowering the cost of much of that work.

In a September analysis⁠, Google’s Threat Intelligence Group reported that monthly vulnerability disclosures roughly doubled between January and August 2026. Vulnerabilities observed being exploited increased from an average of 10.5 per month in 2025 to 18 in 2026.

Not all of this can be attributed to AI. But Google found that much of the growth in exploitation came from n-days, vulnerabilities that had already been disclosed. Google suggests AI tools may be helping attackers analyze software patches, vulnerability disclosures and proof-of-concept code to develop exploits faster.

Consider the implications.

A vendor releases a security fix. The attacker can use information about the vulnerability to target systems that haven’t been patched. The enterprise has to test the fix and deploy it across a complex environment.

The attacker may be getting faster at exploiting the gap between a patch becoming available and its deployment. The defender still has to live with the consequences of getting that deployment wrong.

When the fix becomes the problem

In July 2024, CrowdStrike deployed a faulty security update that disrupted approximately 8.5 million Windows devices⁠ worldwide.

But Microsoft’s November 12 outage is an even more interesting example. According to Microsoft’s preliminary incident report⁠, the company traced the failure to a software fix deployed in July. It passed testing, rolled out globally and operated without visible problems for more than three months.

Then a combination of increased network traffic and reduced capacity exposed the defect. Servers stopped responding. Redirecting traffic to other servers overloaded those too.

Why hadn’t testing caught it?

The defect was more likely to occur on newer machines with more processor cores. Microsoft’s load tests used weaker hardware configurations with fewer cores, along with a different mix of traffic. The tests were run on the wrong combination of machines and workloads.

A test only checks what someone thought to test.

This wasn’t an AI failure. But it illustrates how difficult it already is to safely change complex systems. Now imagine AI dramatically increasing the volume and speed of software changes. Does our ability to validate them improve at the same rate?

This week, JPMorgan experienced a software defect that delayed transactions involving other banks. Separately, the NSA’s classified network suffered a disruption reportedly linked to security patching⁠.

And on November 19, Reuters reported⁠ that JPMorgan had disclosed a cyberattack targeting third-party vendors. Attackers accessed certain marketing data held by those vendors, potentially including customer names and email addresses. The bank said this was unrelated to Monday’s outage.

These events have different causes. But together they illustrate how attacks and operational failures can affect interconnected systems, including those outside an enterprise’s direct control.

The two sides don’t pay the same costs

An attacker can attempt thousands of exploits and discard the failures. He doesn’t have to maintain service availability, satisfy regulators or worry about breaking a customer’s payment system.

The defender does !!!

Even if AI makes writing a patch nearly free, deploying it safely can remain expensive.

This is the argument I explored in Migrating Scarcity⁠. When something becomes abundant, scarcity moves elsewhere.

In cybersecurity, producing exploits and fixes is becoming cheaper. Establishing confidence that a fix is safe in production may not be getting cheaper nearly as quickly.

AI can help, of course. It can identify dependencies, generate tests, simulate failures and automate recovery. But none of that guarantees the tests represent what actually happens in production. Microsoft’s experience is a useful reminder.

There is a human dimension too.

Experienced engineers often recognize problems because they have watched systems fail in unexpected ways. They developed that judgment through routine maintenance, incident response and troubleshooting. If AI takes over much of that routine work, who develops the judgment needed when something unusual happens?

That is the problem I explored in The Corner Case⁠. Automating work can also remove the experience through which people learn to handle exceptions.

What should boards ask?

Most boards already ask about cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities and incident response.

I would add three questions.

How fast can we safely change our systems? Measure the time between a critical fix becoming available and its safe deployment, not simply how quickly a patch can be installed.

How well can we contain a failure? Ask for actual recovery and rollback times, including failures involving critical third parties.

Who can recognize when an automated fix is unsafe? And how are we developing the next generation of people capable of making that judgment?

The bigger question

The marginal cost of cyberattacks doesn’t have to reach zero for the economics to change dramatically. If attackers can multiply their attempts faster than defenders can safely respond, we have a structural problem.

If the pressure to respond faster produces more outages, we have an even bigger one.

The answer isn’t simply to patch faster or slower. It is to make changes safer, failures easier to contain and operational judgment easier to develop.

The question is no longer just whether we can keep attackers out – It is whether we can keep critical systems running while attacks and defenses both change at machine speed.

Writing the fix is getting cheap. Trusting it still costs a lot !!!

Published by Vijay Vijayasankar

Son/Husband/Dad/Dog Lover/Engineer. Follow me on twitter @vijayasankarv. These blogs are all my personal views - and not in way related to my employer or past employers

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